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CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

- Plaintiff, knowing that the driver of the automobile in which she was
riding had been drinking, continued to ride with him though she was under
no compulsion to do so. In an accident resulting from the driver's intoxication,
plaintiff was injured and the driver killed. In an action against the personal
representative of the driver, the defendant raised the defense of volenti non fit
injuria. Held, for plaintiff. The maxim volenti non fit injuria would apply

RECENT DECISIONS
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only where the drunkenness of the driver was extreme and glaring. Dann 'U.
Hamilton, [1939] 1 K. B. 509.
Judged in the light of American decisions on this same question, the
principal case is an interesting oddity. Some American courts hold that the
mere fact that one rides in a car as the guest of the owner and driver, knowing
that he is more or less intoxicated, does not necessarily show negligence precluding recovery from the owner for his negligent driving. In other words,
whether plaintiff guest was negligent depends on the degree of the driver's
intoxication.1 But the great majority of courts hold that to ride knowingly 2
with an intoxicated driver necessarily bars or materially limits the extent of the
guest's recovery against the driver, regardless of the degree of intoxication.
The courts, however, are not agreed on the basis for precluding the guest's
recovery in these cases. One view is that a guest is contributorily negligent
when he rides with an intoxicated driver. 8 The other view is that a guest
assumes the risk when he rides with an intoxicated driver and so the driver
owes him no duty." Some courts hopelessly confuse the theories of contributory
negligence and assumption of risk in denying the guest a recovery.G With the
1 Wold v. Gardner, 167 Wash. 191, 8 P. (2d) 975 (1932); Simensky v. Zweyer,
40 Ohio App. 275, 178 N. E. 422 (1931); Fitzpatrick v. Cinitis, 107 Conn. 91,
139 A. 639 (1927); McKeen v. Iverson, 47 N. D. 132, 180 N. W. 805 (1921).
And in the last analysis these decisions may not be so very different from the view
of the English court, for the judge in the principal case indicated by his language a
willingness to apply the doctrine of oolenti non fit injurio if the degree of intoxication
was extreme.
2 Apparently all courts require that the guest "know'' of the driver's condition
before he is charged with "contributory negligence" or "assumption of risk." But
what constitutes knowledge? Must there be actual knowledge? See Bubar v. Fisher,
134 Me. 10, 180 A. 923 (1935). Or is it sufficient that a reasonably prudent man
would have known? See Toppass v. Perkins' Admx., 268 Ky. 186, 104 S. W. (2d)
423 (1937); Hicks v. Herbert, 173 Tenn. I, II3 S. W. (2d) II97 (1938).
8 Clinton v. City of West Monroe, (La. App. 1939) 187 So. 561; Franco v.
Vakares, 35 Ariz. 309, 277 P. 812 (1929); Yates v. Brazleton, 108 Cal. App. 533>
291 P. 695 (1930); Connor v. Johnson, 132 Cal. App. 449, 22 P. (2d) 760 (1933);
French v. Tebben, 53 Idaho 701, 27 P. (2d) 475 (1933); Richard v. Canning>
(La. App. 1935) 158 So. 598; Bubar v. Fisher, 134 Me. 10, 180 A. 923 (1935);
Lewis v. Chitwood Motor Co., 196 Ark. 86, u5 S. W. (2d) 1072 (1938); Hicks
v. Herbert, 173 Tenn. 1, II3 S. W. (2d) II97 (1938); Sparks v. Chitwood
Motor Co., 192 Ark. 743, 94 S. W. (2d) 359 (1936).
"Toppass v. Perkins' Admx., 268 Ky. 186, 104 S. W. (2d) 423 (1937);
Winston's Admx. v. City of Henderson, 179 Ky. 220, 200 S. W. 330 (1918);
Archer v. Bourne, 222 Ky. 268, 300 S. W. 604 (1927). In Wisconsin, where assumption of risk is. clearly a defense, there are three elements necessary to the defense:
(1) a hazard or danger inconsistent with the safety of the guest; (2) knowledge and
appreciation of the hazard by the guest; (3) acquiescence or a willingness to proceed
in the face of danger. See: Krueger v. Krueger, 197 Wis. 588, 222 N. W. 784
(1929); Sommerfield v. Flury, 198 Wis. 163, 223 N. W. 408 (1929); Page v.
Page, 199 Wis. 641, 227 N. W. 233 (1929); Brockhaus v. Neuman, 201 Wis.
57, 228 N. W. 477 (1930); Knipfer v. Shaw, 210 Wis. 617, 246 N. W. 328, 247
N. W. 320 (1933); Markovich v. Schlafke, 230 Wis. 639, 284 N. W. 516 (1939).
GReynolds' Admx. v. Waggener, 271 Ky. 300, II I S. W. (2d) 647 (1938);
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increasing number of "host-guest" statutes and "comparative negligence"
statutes, it is important that the courts begin to distinguish clearly the basis upon
which they deny the guest a recovery. At common law, contributory negligence is a complete defense to an action for negligence except where the
negligence amounts to a reckless, wanton or wilful act. 6 Many "host-guest"
statutes allow recovery only when the negligence of the driver is reckless,
wanton, or wilful. Since this means that contributory negligence is not available
as a defense when the action is within the "host-guest" statute, the only defense
open to the defendant in such case is assumption of risk. Moreover, the existence
of a "comparative negligence" statute does not make contributory negligence a
partial or complete defense under such "host-guest" statutes.7 Even in jurisdictions where contributory negligence is available as a defense in a hostguest case, it is no longer a complete defense if there is a "comparative negligence" statute. Rather, it is but a partial defense unless the contributory negligence can be. shown to equal the negligence of the defendant. 8 Assumption of
risk, on the other hand, is a complete defense in such cases.9 Of course there is
no assumption of risk if the guest had no chance to ·get out of the car after
learning of the driver's intoxication or if it would have been unreasonable to
expect the guest to get out of the car though he had the opportunity.10 So,
whether the courts choose to call riding with an intoxicated driver contributory
negligence or assumption of risk may mean the difference between a complete
defense and only a partial defense or perhaps no defense at all.
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Krueger v. Krueger, 197 Wis. 588, 222 N. W. 784 (1929); Keller v. City of Port
Washington, 200 Wis. 87, 227 N. W. 284 (1929).
6 1 SHEARMAN AND REDFIELD, THE LAw OF NEGLIGENCE, 6th ed., 159 (1913).
7 White v. McVicker, 216 Iowa 90, 246 N. W. 385 (1933); Siesseger v. Poth,
213 Iowa 164, 239 N. W. 46 (1931); Sheehy v. Abboud, 126 Neb. 554, 253 N. W.
683 (1934).
8 See Wis."Stat. (1937), § 331.045. Bot see 35 Stat. L. 66 (1908), 45 U.S. C.
(1934), § 53; Ga. Code Ann. (1933), § 66-402; Fla. Comp. Gen. Laws (1927), §
7052.
11 Knipfer v. Shaw, 210 Wis. 617, 246 N. W. 328, 247 N. W. 320 (1933);
Markovich v. Schlafke, 230 Wis. 639, 284 N. W. 516 (1939).
10 Meighan v. Baker, 119 Cal. App. 582, 6 P. (2d) 1015 (1932); Hirsch
v. D'Autremont, 133 Cal. App. 106, 23 P. (2d) 1066 (1933); Archer v. Bourne,
222 Ky. 268, 300 S. W. 604 (1927); Trotter v. Bullock, 148 Wash. 516, 269 P.
825 (1928); O'Connell v. McKeown, 270 Mass. 432, 170 N. E. 402 (1930).

